Introduction
This paper aims at presenting some of the results of our research activity at the intersection between computer science and philosophy of science started in 1997 under Marco Somalvico's impulse and guidance. This paper is a tribute to his visionary ingenuity.
Scientific practice has been rapidly evolving in the last years under the pressure of developments in computer science and technology. The most evident aspect of this evolution is probably the massive use of computers to support scientific activity 1,2 . Computational tools have been proven useful also to represent scientific results, as it is evident in the Computational Philosophy of Science 3, 4 . The contribution provided by this paper lies at the intersection of both computational scientific discovery and computational philosophy of science and represents an example of interdisciplinary research. In particular, it shows how specific areas of computer science and philosophy can mutually enrich each other.
We start by illustrating the two roles of computational tools, as support and as representation, and then we focus the discussion on the specific class of computational tools under the name of multiagent systems 5 . We argue that multiagent systems in the context of scientific discovery are particularly well-suited to play the double role outlined above: they can be very efficient supports for scientists in carrying on their scientific activities and they can provide special forms of representation of scientific results. Note that this distinction of roles is purely conventional. We adopt it only because we deem it may help in clarifying the contribution of computational devices and multiagent systems to scientific discovery.
In the following, multiagent systems will be shortly described. We do not exhaustively survey all the issues of multiagent systems but we concentrate only on those that make them an appropriate paradigm and an effective technology to be employed within modern scientific discovery scenarios. Multiagent systems are becoming an increasingly important approach for developing "intelligent distributed systems" 5, 6, 7 . Originated from Distributed Artificial Intelligence 8 , multiagent systems constitute now an autonomous area with a number of assessed techniques, methods, technologies, and tools. In particular, we concentrate our attention on a special class of multiagent systems in which the agents are cooperatively oriented toward a single global goal. These cooperative multiagent systems can be conveniently called agencies to stress their unitary nature in addressing global problems 9 . In this paper, agents are computer programs or robots that cooperatively interact. For example, in a scenario different from scientific discovery, agents can be mobile robots that cooperate in a team to win a soccer game in the Robocup domain 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 . Two main properties of multiagent systems, and in particular of agencies, make their use appropriate within scientific enterprise.
• Their multiparadigmatic nature. It is natural to embed in the agents different paradigms for solving a problem or for achieving a goal. Cooperation among the agents harmonizes these different paradigms in a coordinated effort to solve a global problem or to achieve a global goal. This cooperation enlarges the range of problems that single agents can tackle.
• Their flexibility. It is usually easy to modify the modular composition of a multiagent system in order to exploit the best combination of agents for tackling a given problem. In this sense, multiagent systems are usually open systems. This argumentation is supported by the observation that many of the cooperation mechanisms presented in literature usually scale to large numbers of agents, as happens, for example, for the well-known contract net paradigm 25 . With this paradigm, a number of agents can decide how to allocate a task by exchanging messages.
The main original contribution of this paper is the global and unitary view it presents over the research we have carried on with Marco Somalvico. Some results reported here have been already published. In particular, the role of computational tools as support and representation has been discussed in (Refs. 26, 27) , the mul- tiagent approach to represent the models of complex systems has been proposed in (Ref. 28) , and the use of agencies as a metaphor to represent scientific results has been introduced in (Refs. 29, 30) . The merit of this work is to gather all these results in one place and to give an organic view that is enriched by some original issues developed by the authors in the very last years.
In this paper we mostly present concepts and ideas that are exemplified by specific implemented systems, both taken from the literature and developed by ourselves. However, we will not describe all the technical details of these systems, for which we refer to the cited bibliography, because our purpose here is to present the general framework of the role of multiagent systems in scientific discovery.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate how computational devices can support scientists in their work. In Section 3 we illustrate how computational devices can represent scientific results both concretely and metaphorically. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Computational Scientific Discovery
The idea to perform scientific discoveries in an automatic way with a computer program has been a constant tendency in the history of Artificial Intelligence, since it represents an effective benchmark to evaluate the "intelligence" of machines. In this section we outline the evolution of artificial systems for supporting scientific discovery activities, from the first general tools developed in the 1960s to the multiagent systems adopted today. In general, the question arising is: what does change in scientific practice with the extensively adoption of computational tools? In the following, we present our answer by illustrating the general role of computational devices in scientific practice (Section 2.1) and the more specific role of multiagent systems (Section 2.2).
From Automated Discovery to E-Science
In the history of science the use of devices and machines to perform scientific discoveries has always been constant. The adoption of the telescope by Galileo Galilei probably represented the most famous example of this tendency. The observations collected by Galilei with the telescope (such as those related to the surface of the Moon and to the Jupiter satellites) started an astronomic revolution that, then, became a more general scientific revolution.
Beyond devices that supported scientists in their interactive activities related to perception (as in the Galilei's case) and manipulation, the advent of machines and tools able to support scientists in their intellectual activities represented a further breaking point in science. The history of the use of telescope is again a paradigmatic example: modern telescopes, which are equipped with sophisticated devices to process the enormous quantities of data they acquire, can provide also a kind of intellectual support for scientists. The very famous Hubble Space Telescope 31 is equipped with optics and computational devices that capture light from the cosmos, convert it into digital data, and transmit them back to the Earth. For example, the Hubble's sensor called Wide Field and Planetary Camera 2 uses four cameras to view large portions of the sky. A image processing software smoothly integrates the images captured by the cameras. This shows that Hubble's accurate and precise observations are obtained not just using several sophisticate sensors but also processing the data they provide with computational devices.
In the 1960s, a new area in Artificial Intelligence was born called Automated Scientific Discovery: it had the goal to design and implement computer programs to make autonomous scientific discoveries. These first programs exploited a psychological approach: it was necessary, first, to study how scientists make discoveries and, then, to design programs following the same (or very similar) processes. Probably the best-known example of this approach was the program BACON 32 , based on the idea that scientific discovery is a form of problem solving. It was devoted to the discovery of Kepler's laws and developed by Herbert Simon and his research group. Other programs, for automatic theorem proving, such as AM 33 , and those applied to chemistry, such as DENDRAL and Meta-DENDRAL 34 , were also developed. However, several problems arose from the very beginning of this research area: the lack of concrete applications for these programs, their inability to operate with complete autonomy, and the fact that, in many cases, they were able only to rediscover already known laws.
It was only at the beginning of the 1990s that the field turned to the design of the so-called Computer-Supported Scientific Environments 35 . Here the idea was to produce only partially autonomous programs, after acknowledging the necessity of the human role. The psychological approach became less central and more attention was devoted to real-world applications. Several methods have been developed and significative systems have been implemented, including GOLEM 36 and MECHEM 37 . The idea of computational assistance has been further carried on at the end of the 1990s, the period in which the label Computational Scientific Discovery started to denote the field. Programs have been applied to real scientific problems and their results have been evaluated in accordance to the so-called "publication criterion": only results published in the journals of the related scientific fields can be considered real scientific discoveries. Nowadays the goal is to design and realize sophisticated instruments to support human scientists in their activities, and not completely autonomous tools. Different approaches are employed for this goal: from inductive logic programming 38 , to planning 39 . In the very last years this scenario has further evolved to embrace the idea of virtual laboratories 40 devoted to handle large data sets, to share information for collaboration, and to manage distributed resources. These frameworks seem to work particularly well, since they exploit the complementary abilities of humans and machines. Humans have breadth and depth in the knowledge of the domain and heuristics; while programs exhibit speed, ability, and accuracy in manipulating raw data 41 . Thus, the current trend, rather that increasing the creative autonomy of the programs devoted to scientific discovery, is oriented to set up interactive discovery environments 42 , where scientists are assisted by intelligent machines (e.g., in understanding data and in retrieving information) but still remain in control of the whole scientific process. Science progressively becomes e-science 43 , where the assistant role of computational tools is emphasized both out of necessity (because of complexity) and out of usefulness (because of speed).
Within this context, it is worth noting that biology is the most promising direction of development for computer science applications 44 . Genes of living cells are DNA sequences of bases taken from a four-letter alphabet 45 . The genes are translated into proteins. Proteins are sequences of joined amino acids taken from a 20-letter alphabet. Proteins play several functional roles, from catalyzing biochemical reactions to transmitting signals. In the following, we present two cases of employment of computational devices in biological research. The first example, the Screensaver Lifesaver Project 46 , shows how very simple computational tools adopted on a large scale can effectively support scientific discovery. The project aims to accelerate the research for new cancer drugs by means of a distributed peer-to-peer software, which uses the spare time of computers to screen molecules that could have potential anti-cancer activities. The difficulty basically lies in the large number of molecules to be screened. The Screensaver Lifesaver Project screens 3.5 billion molecules for cancer-fighting potential. Analyzing this huge amount of data clearly requires an enormous computational power: traditional information processing machines are not enough and even super-computers give limited support to scientists in order to evaluate potential anti-cancer molecules. The original solution adopted in the Screensaver Lifesaver Project exploits the unused computational power of the largest possible number of computers working in parallel. Anybody interested in the project (and not only scientists) can offer his or her collaboration by donating the "screen saver time" of his or her computer. The project will be all the more successful, the more people will subscribe and will make their computers available for creating a virtual super-computer. At the moment over 3 million computers have joined the project with over 410, 000 years of CPU power used.
The second example, the Human Genome Project (HGP) 47 , demonstrates, instead, the usefulness of developing very specific and complex computational tools. The aim of this project is to decode DNA (more precisely, the complete nucleotide sequence) that constitutes the human genome, in order to better understand the causes of diseases, the interplay between environment and heredity, and the human evolution. The success of this project strongly depends on the availability of various machines, in particular those embedding the computational methods for sequencing the human genome. The advent of the first automated DNA sequencers in the HGP emphasizes the increasingly importance of computational tools in science. These sequencers have considerably improved the human speed in sequencing bases (the building block of DNA) and promoted the success of the project. In the first years of the project, when they were not available, a researcher was able to isolate and read 10, 000 − 20, 000 bases per day. Nowadays, an automated sequencer is able to process 10 million bases per day.
Agents in E-science
Current scientific practice requires the integration and combination of resources, data, and scientific expertise. Systems are sought that can break down the barriers of distance providing location-transparent environments by which scientists located at different institutions can cooperate. For example, these systems are required to enhance remote collaboration at scarce facilities, like particular particle accelerators and large electron microscopes. With their support, a researcher can prepare a sample in his or her laboratory and then ship the sample to a facility where a technician, operating in video and audio contact with the researcher, does the final preparation of the sample and loads the sample into the experiment chamber. The researcher sets up the experiment, operates directly on the sample, and collects the data, without leaving his laboratory 48, 49 . These ideas are grouped under the concept of virtual laboratory introduced above. In general, a virtual laboratory is a system that allows scientists conducting remote cooperative experiments, doing simulations, and communicating 50 . For example, virtual laboratories can provide benefits to molecular modeling for drug design 51 , a task involving geographically distributed resources, and to analyze data from DNA micro-arrays 40 , a data-intensive task requiring large-scale computational resources.
Agent technology 52 offers an effective way to implement systems for virtual laboratories and e-science. Agents are capable to carry on operations in distributed, dynamic, and open environments such as those outlined above. Moreover, agents can provide a solution for integrating newly developed systems with legacy software and systems. Existing systems can be wrapped by agents, clearly separating the domain specific level, hidden inside the wrapping agents, and the agent level, at which information is exchanged in the system. At the agent level, the use of ontologies is required to define a common language and a common set of concepts for the agents. The use of service agents, like directory facilitator agents and yellow pages agents, enables the development of open systems in which the agents can connect and disconnect at any moment.
To show concretely how agent technology can provide an effective support to current scientific practice, we present a couple of examples taken from bioinformatics. The role of agent technology in biology practice is mostly related to information management tasks, given the huge amount of data currently generated while sequencing organisms. These data are usually available from several distinct locations, their formats are heterogeneous, they are continuously updated, and new data sources constantly appear. Multiagent systems provide an effective mean to gather, process, and integrate these data 53 . The existence of different methods, implemented in different analysis tools, with which biologists determine functions of genes starting from available data makes this scenario even more complex. Several agent-based systems have been developed for addressing different tasks in bioinfor- matics that require the management of huge amount of information.
GeneWeaver 54 is a general system aiming at helping scientists to predict the structure (and, thus, the functions) of proteins encoded by DNA sequences. GeneWeaver does not offer new methods for performing this task but integrates existing databases and analysis tools in a dynamic way. More specifically, there are agents wrapping databases, including Protein Data Bank and SWISSPROT, and there are agents wrapping tools for processing sequence data in order to analyze the sequence and determine the structure of a protein, including BLAST and InterPro. Broker agents uncouple the above classes of agents and facilitate their matchmaking. The flexibility introduced by the agent technology in this case allows to cope effectively with a changing number of resources (both databases and analysis tools).
A prototype system for the automated annotation of herpesvirus sequences has been presented in (Ref. 55) . The system, called BioMAS, is composed of a number of information extraction agents that, given a genome sequence s, find the annotations (comments in natural language) of the sequences that are similar to s. Then, an annotation agent integrates the retrieved annotations to annotate s. Also in this case, the main advantage provided by using agent technology is that new data sources and analysis tools can be easily integrated in the system. A similar multiagent system for automatic annotation of mycoplasmas sequences is reported in (Ref. 56).
Computational Philosophy of Science
Computational tools are not just supports for scientists carrying on their scientific research, but they can be also employed as special forms of representations of scientific results. In this section we present some computational approaches to the explanation of scientific discovery that give rise to a new area of philosophy of science called Computational Philosophy of Science, which promotes a more rigorous approach to philosophy. Artificial intelligent systems are adopted here to build models of philosophical problems concerning scientific knowledge. The question arising is: what does change in scientific explanation with the adoption of these novel computational tools of analysis? In the following, after a discussion on the nature of scientific discovery (Section 3.1), we outline an answer by illustrating the general role of computational tools in scientific explanation (Section 3.2) and the more specific role of multiagent systems (Section 3.3), even as metaphors for representation (Section 3.4). Note that, while the discussion of Section 2 has been mainly based on works reported in the literature, the following discussion is mainly based on our results.
The Nature of Scientific Discovery
The analysis of scientific discovery represents the core point in order to grasp the nature of scientific enterprise, since understanding the mechanisms and the processes involved in scientific activity is crucial to analyze the development of scientific knowledge. The study of scientific discovery can be afforded according to different perspectives. It can be settled in the wider scenario of the analysis of scientific thought and from here analyzed, adopting a top-down approach, from the philosophical, sociological, and cognitive point of view 57 . It can also be viewed, adopting the opposite bottom-up approach, at the light of the last challenges and successes of the technological evolution like the production of paradigmatic and concrete models of explanation 58 . Without discussing which one is the most profitable and promising approach, we present some general issues concerning the characterization of scientific discovery. The term 'discovery' is related to the process of knowing something new, something obscure. When is it possible to speak about scientific discovery? When the object of the discovery process is scientific (facts, laws, properties) or, instead, when the method is scientific (either experimental or mathematical)? Traditionally, philosophers of science have considered scientific discovery as a purely creative activity that cannot be fully explained in philosophy due to its not completely rational nature. By contrast, historians of science and psychologists have studied scientific discovery and the process of innovation in science, even from a psychological point of view.
Starting from Hans Reichenbach's pioneering work 59 , the creative nature of scientific discovery has been further stressed by Karl Popper 60 who, for this reason, concentrated his work on the logic of justification, rather than the logic of discovery. He stressed that it is not important, from a rational point of view, how a scientist conceives a theory or makes a discovery, namely the process of invention underlying the discovery activity. What counts is how a scientist justifies the scientific or rational nature of a theory. Although we do not want to underestimate Popper's fundamental contribution to the analysis of scientific discovery, we believe, as the majority of the philosophers of science do, that some important points related to the nature of scientific discovery must be brought under close scrutiny and be made, if not the focus of attention, then at the very least, one of its foci. The risk, otherwise, is to exclude from the realm of science a central activity in which scientists are involved: the process of discovery. However, the lesson learned from a fifty year long debate is that there does not exist a single logic of discovery, but several different logics or methods. Scientific discovery ought no more to be excluded from the domain of rational activities, and it can be addressed with rational tools of analysis.
In general, it is possible to identify three different stages in the whole process of scientific discovery. First, generation which is the production of a particulary interesting idea connected to the problem under investigation. Usually this first part is an individual and creative activity, even if subjected to some constraints and controls imposed by the scientific practice. After, the phase of research occurs: what has been previously discovered receives the active attention of researchers. Finally, acceptance concludes the process: the final results of the process of discovery are shared and, in a way, are certified by the scientific community.
An interesting perspective to understand the process and the products of scientific discovery is through the lens of computational scientific discovery analyzed in Section 2. If we believe that science is a rational activity, the goal of the philosopher of science is to make explicit the principles that scientists use to evaluate theories, showing that these principles are correct from a rational point of view. In the endeavor to grasp the essence of scientific discovery, an approach is to investigate its automatic reproducibility. If it were possible to realize a scientific discovery process by a computer program, it would be easier to understand the distinctive features of scientific discovery itself. Conversely, only when a process is rationally expressed we can hope to formalize and reproduce it by a machine. The basic idea of this approach is that the implementation level (computational scientific discovery) offers the opportunity to test the ideas proposed at the theoretical level (computational philosophy of science). In this sense, computational scientific discovery has led, from the one side, to the design of computational supports for scientists (Section 2) and, from the other side, to the conception of computational models of the processes involved in scientific discovery capable to give an account of the development of scientific knowledge.
Computational Models and Scientific Explanations
The adoption of computational tools to support the explanation of scientific activities (and not only to support their performance) promotes the invention of new models of explanation in some scientific areas. Computational philosophy of science adopts computer programs, and in particular programs embedding artificial intelligent techniques, to build models of analysis of philosophical problems related to scientific knowledge. The idea is to exploit both conceptual models and concrete devices developed, in particular, by the research in Artificial Intelligence in order to approach traditional and novel issues in philosophy of science. These issues cover a wide range of topics, from how scientific discovery can be viewed computationally 61 to the analysis of the role of the automated discovery systems within the debate of scientific realism 62 . For example, a theory of explicative coherence has been implemented in a connectionist program (ECHO) able to evaluate hypotheses in parallel and to choose the more coherent ones with respect to evidence 3,4,63,64,65a . The described approach to the philosophy of science provides several advantages. In general, precision and completeness are improved; from a practical point of view, this means that problems become computationally tractable. Moreover, they can be graphically represented in easy ways and can be experimentally tested in computational settings. The implementation of a working program, implementing philosophical ideas, is a useful test to evaluate the validity of the underlying assumptions, concerning for example the structure of scientific developments. It is a In fact, this work of Thagard was first reported at the end of the 1980s, and applied to the simulation of jurors' reasoning about the evidence of a criminal cause. By the way, that was when ALIBI, a planner that proposes exonerating explanations, was first reported about 66,67,68 . Thagard's ECHO and Nissan's ALIBI -the latter with the encouragement of Marco Somalvico -inaugurated artificial intelligence modelling of reasoning about legal evidence 69, 70 , which must not be confused with computer-assisted forensic testing techniques.
worth stressing, however, that computational philosophy of science does not entail a reductionist stance: computational supports need always to be integrated by cognitive and social abilities that only humans posses.
The way in which science is explained by computational philosophy of science radically changes. These changes include not only methods of explanation, but also the ways in which an explanation can be considered satisfactory. This is clear if we consider the evolution of the concept of model and its role in scientific descriptions. One of the main activities in scientific discovery is represented by the invention of new models starting from observation and analysis of phenomena. Therefore, scientific activity can be seen as the construction of models that must be adequate to the phenomena 71 . In addition, the knowledge of reality by scientific methods involves a multiplicity of models that give reason to a whole set of phenomena. Not only new models, but also the connections among the new and the old models are part of scientific modeling since they must be invented whenever new models are devised.
Sometimes it is possible to embed these models in computer programs, obtaining what can be called an operational description. If we see scientific discovery as the creation of adequate models 57, 71 , the role of computational tools is concentrated not only on the process of invention of these models, but also on the description of the products (i.e., the models created by the process).
In its simplest form, the role of computational tools for representing scientific models comes down to store the huge quantity of data composing a model. For example, consider the evidence found by the scientific activities grouped under the Human Genome Project discussed before. In this case, computational tools are indispensable to store the huge quantity of complex data relative to the genome. A million of bases require about 1 megabyte of memory on a computer: since the human genome includes 3 billion bases, around 3 gigabyte of memory are necessary in order to store it, without considering all the annotations which are essential to complete the information describing each gene. It would be impossible to manage this enormous amount of information by hand. Moreover, this management results, if possible, harder if we consider that the aim of the Human Genome Project is not limited only to identify human genes and map their positions on the chromosome, but also to determine the role of each protein of the DNA in the organism.
Computational tools can also play a more interesting role than simply storing information: they can provide a paradigm to effectively represent scientific models. In this respect, computing abstractions are used to describe the results of scientific processes. For example, computational abstractions are useful for modeling biomolecular systems 72 . Moreover, string processing abstractions can be used to represent and simulate DNA, RNA, and sequences of amino acids 44 . In the next section, we discuss an example of the role of multiagent systems in providing a useful paradigm to represent models of complex physiological phenomena.
Multiagent Systems for Modeling
In this section, we present some results we obtained in a research oriented to investigate the use of multiagent systems as a paradigm to model complex phenomena related to human physiology.
The main points of our approach are summarized in the following.
• When facing a complex phenomenon, it is extremely difficult to identify a single, adequate, and satisfactory model. • The phenomenon can be often modeled only by a set of (interconnected) partial models.
• The partial models are embedded in computational autonomous entities, the agents, that represent different views and that, individually taken, capture only part of the complexity of the phenomenon.
• The introduction of a cooperative negotiation activity between the agents embedding the partial models forms a multiagent system able to provide a unique global model of the complex phenomenon.
In this way, each agent is a software program that embeds the partial model of a particular physiological process. Accordingly, each agent makes its proposals on the values of the variables that represent the phenomenon of interest.
Modeling complex dynamic systems is notoriously a difficult task in engineering. It is commonplace in literature the idea to tackle complexity by using different partial models at different scales and in different operating contexts 73 , as in the multimodeling approach 74, 75 . While multimodeling techniques are explicitly oriented to build hierarchies of homogeneous and heterogeneous models at different levels of abstraction, in our work we concentrated so far on partial models that are at the same level of abstraction.
We experimentally applied the proposed multiagent approach to the modeling of two complex physiological phenomena: the glucose-insulin metabolism 76 and the heart rate regulatory system 77 . In the first case, we implemented two agents embedding partial models related, respectively, to food adsorption (that determines the insulin level to reduce the glucose level during food adsorption) and to physical activity (that keeps constant the glucose level by limiting the insulin level when the physical activity is intense). These agents negotiate to determine the insulin level of a person. In the second case, we implemented two agents embedding partial models that relate the heart rate to the length of the QT interval (a quantity calculated from electrocardiogram data) and to the respiration rate (the number of respiration cycles per minute), respectively, and that negotiate to determine the heart rate of a person.
The properties exhibited by multiagent systems, such as their multiparadigmatic nature, autonomy, mobility, and cooperation allow them to find a "natural" application in decentralized modeling of complex systems 78 . However, the presence of a multiplicity of models of a unique phenomenon raises several issues about their coexistence and their combination. In particular the models can be "overlapping" and, as consequence, conflicts can occur (e.g., different models can determine different values for the heart rate). Techniques such as weighted average, model selection according to confidence indexes, and fuzzy combination do not always solve the conflicts, since they do not take into account any inter-effect between the models. To solve these conflicts, we employ cooperative negotiation 79, 80, 81 in which agents, although operating as independent entities, harmoniously cooperate to bring in consonance the estimates they provide. In practice, this means that the values of variables that are part of different partial models (e.g., the heart rate) are negotiated between the agents to reach an agreement representing the value provided by the global model. This cooperative negotiation mechanism between the agents is the "glue" that makes the multiagent system a unitary entity.
The cooperative negotiation process is a cyclic repetition of two phases. In the first one, each agent makes its proposal in order to satisfy its internal partial model and to accommodate the desires of the other agents, implicitly expressed by the last counter-proposal. In the second one, a mediator calculates the weighted average of the proposed values for each variable and sends this value back to the agents as counter-proposal. Then, the process restarts with the agents that calculate the new proposals and so on. After an agreement is reached or after a timeout has expired, the mediator produces a unique final decision that maximizes the social welfare. This final decision is taken every 30 seconds in the glucose-insulin metabolism case and every 2 seconds in the heart rate regulation case. The adoption of the mediator, which uncouples the agents, guarantees the building of flexible and dynamic systems of agents, which composition can be easily modified. To help the reader to better grasp the ideas behind our approach, we describe in some detail the multiagent system that models the heart rate regulatory system (the following simplified presentation is based on that in (Ref. 77) ).
We have taken into account two partial models that relate the heart rate (beats per minute) to two different variables: the length of QT interval (ms) and the respiration rate (cycles per minute). The first control model relates the heart rate (HR) to the length of QT interval as proposed by Sarma et al. in (Ref. 82) :
while the second control model relates the heart rate (HR) to the respiration rate (RR) and is a slight refinement of the model proposed by Voukydis and Krasner in (Ref. 83) :
where q i and r i are parameters that must be tailored to the specific person. Both the models, when individually taken, do not describe appropriately the heart rate regulatory physiological system. However, each model provides an approximate description of the heart rate regulatory system. In this sense, we call them partial models.
We embed in an agent, called QT agent, the model described by (1) , and in another agent, called RR agent, the model described by (2) . To do this, we define the utility functions U QT and U RR , where U i :
2 → . In particular, U QT : A QT → where A QT ≡ HR × QT, and U RR : A RR → where A RR ≡ HR × RR. The state of the QT agent can be described by a pair of values hr, qt , and the state of the RR agent by a pair of values hr, rr . In addition, we call A ≡ A QT A RR ; a vector p ∈ A (i.e., hr, qt, rr ) describes the state of the entire system. Note that qt and rr are given and hr is estimated by negotiation. Given a point q ∈ A QT (respectively, A RR ) and calling d(q) the Euclidean distance of q from the curve (1) (respectively, (2)) U QT (q) (respectively, U RR (q)) is calculated as:
The formulas (3) have been experimentally determined after several trials in order to define steep potential functions that assign high values to the points that are far from the optimal curves. These functions are also piecewise convex, to avoid local minima. In Fig. 1 , U QT and U RR are shown. The goal of each agent is to change the heart rate in order to drive the system to the state with minimum utility nearest to the current state, according to its own utility-based model. The two agents read the information about their states (p QT = hr, qt and p RR = hr, rr ). Then, the agents assign to p 
m t is the agreement reached in the negotiation session at time t. Note that m t is a point in A; in the above formula, the sum at the numerator is intended to sum 
where α i (·) and β i (·), called negotiation parameters, are two functions on A i to , . . . is the vector norm, and u 
This versor is headed towards the agreement (in A i ) at time t (see Fig. 2 ). From (5), it can be seen that the next proposal of the agent i gets closer to the last agreement of the negotiation by a quantity
i→e , proportional to the distance between the last proposal of agent i and the last agreement.
Considering the vector along the direction of the gradient of U i (·) in p t i→e and normalizing it, we obtain the following versor:
This versor points towards the direction of maximum increasing of U i (·) and every vector orthogonal to v t+1 i is tangent to an iso-potential curve (Fig. 2) . Furthermore, a versor orthogonal to the gradient direction (and thus tangent to the level curves of the potential space) is defined as (Fig. 2) :
From (5), it can be seen that the next proposal of an agent tries to keep constant the potential value in the direction of the last agreement, namely it moves in the direction of w and another component that is in the direction of the iso-potential curve on which the last proposal was.
Hence, the next proposal of an agent takes into account two components, the first one pulls towards the negotiation agreement, the second one pushes towards the iso-potential curves. The first component contributes to accommodate the tendency of the society, while the second component contributes to keep the individual agent close to its optimal curve. The values α i (p i ) and β i (p i ) determine the relative weights between these two components. For example, if α i (·) is small (namely, the weight of the component that pushes towards the negotiation agreement is small), the model embedded in agent i has high confidence and its proposal moves only slightly from its optimal curve. The combination of the two partial models (1) and (2) obtained by cooperative negotiation provides a more complete description of the heart rate regulatory system.
The experimental results showed that the models of physiological processes obtained with our multiagent approach are more precise than those obtained with traditional techniques (e.g., by weighted average) to compose partial models. 
The multiagent approach illustrated above constitutes a powerful and modern way to describe the scientific results about the human physiology. As we have seen, the intricate network of human physiology is seldom adequately described by a single "monolithic" model. Indeed, many physiological processes are described by different partial independent models, as in the cases of the glucose-insulin metabolism and of the heart rate regulatory system. The power of the multiagent approach in describing scientific results lies in its possibility to represent the interaction among different partial models. Moreover, the open nature of multiagent systems allows for the easy insertion and removal of agents (partial models), thus offering a flexible tool for partial model composition.
It is interesting to observe that, from a theoretical point of view, the adoption of models as computational entities to represent phenomena is consistent with some approaches in current epistemology. The renewed interest for models in scientific explanation has begun with the classical works by Pat Suppes 84 , whose research has led to the so-called semantic view. Instead of talking of pure theories, philosophers should learn to talk about models of theories, where these models have to be intended in the Tarskian sense as possible realizations in which all valid sentences of a theory T are satisfied. In the last decades this research on models has produced two different tendencies. From the one side, the shift from the semantic view to the model view, based on a wider characterization of the notion of model including individual and collective cognitive features as well 85 . From the other side, the increasing propensity to adopting computational models, because of their calculability. This use of models for scientific explanation in epistemology goes in parallel with the adoption of computational models to describing results in scientific practice.
Metaphorical Scientific Agency
Agencies, as flexible multiparadigmatic cooperative multiagent systems, may also be used to provide a metaphorical description of scientific results. Such metaphorical descriptions emphasize the relations between different discoveries. By metaphorical description we mean a description which is not really implemented in a multiagent system (as opposite to the examples of Section 3.3), but that is inspired in its structure by the multiagent paradigm. In this metaphorical description, we consider a new scientific result (e.g., a new model of a natural phenomenon) represented as an agent that needs to be inserted in a structure in which a number of other agents (e.g., the old models of related natural phenomena) are already present. The way in which the new scientific result is coherently integrated within the old ones resembles the cooperation process between the agents in an agency. It is worth stressing that here the parallelism between models of scientific knowledge and agents of a multiagent system is only a useful metaphor and that the agents discussed in this section are not intended for implemention. The multiagent approach we propose cannot fully explain scientific discovery, but can represent an interesting framework of analysis. The metaphorical description of scientific discovery inspired by the agency paradigm is valuable from an epistemological point of view, since it promotes a new approach to the explanation of the history and the growth of scientific processes. In other words, by adopting such a metaphor we establish a parallelism between the new models resulting from scientific activity and the agents composing an agency that can be helpful to evidence some properties of scientific discovery.
To better explain the flavor of our proposal let us consider an additional metaphor 29 . The phenomena of reality can be represented as patches of a field. Patches that have some portion of the borders in common represent phenomena that are somehow related together. We have chosen the image of patches representing phenomena of reality to give the idea of their vagueness. The models of knowledge of reality can be, instead, represented as tiles of a mosaic. We have chosen the image of tiles representing models of knowledge of reality to give the idea of their precision. In general, since each model corresponds to a phenomenon, in our metaphor each tile corresponds to a patch. As in the field, also in the mosaic, the neighboring between tiles reflects the relations among the models describing related phenomena. This distributed and interacting view of scientific models reminds the concept of agency: to each model (namely, a tile) an agent can be assigned, such that to a given set of integrated models (namely, a mosaic) a set of agents corresponds, namely an agency which we call scientific agency. Therefore in this scientific agency the relations between models are expressed by the connections between the corresponding agents.
According to this framework, the process of scientific discovery can be conceived as composed of two phases: invention of new models, when new models describing reality are invented ex novo, and integration of new models with the old ones, when the connections between new models and old models are set. In our metaphor we can see the invented models as black agents; black because they are invented by an inscrutable intellectual act (use of 'black' for 'opaque' is patterned, here, after 'black box'). Black agents are new both in the models they represent, and in the way they are connected to other agents. To make the discussion clearer and more concrete, we present the application of our conceptualization in terms of agents and agencies to give reason of the historical and conceptual evolution of scientific knowledge during the so called Copernican Revolution 29 , as Thomas Kuhn has presented it in (Ref. 86) . It includes the passages from Ptolemy's geocentrism to Copernicus' heliocentrism, to Galileian system, and to Newtonian dynamics. For example, the addition of epicycles and deferents by the great ancient Greek astronomers Apollonius and Ipparcus to the traditional Aristotelian conception can be seen as the creation of a new black agent. The model including epicycles and deferents is new because it introduces two new movements to describe the orbits of the planets and to explain some apparent irregularities in their motion. Moreover, in a scientific agency, there are gray agents, corresponding to agents that are new concerning the way in which they are connected to other agents, as a consequence of the introduction of black agents. For example, the agent representing the conception of the finite universe in the Copernican system is gray: the content is the same as in Ptolemy's system (both describe a finite universe), but the connections of this part of knowledge to the rest of the models are very different in the case of geogentrism, before, and heliocentrism, after. In the case of geocentrism, the Earth is at the center of this finite universe while, in the case of heliocentrism, the Sun is at the center of the finite universe. Finally, there are white agents corresponding to agents that are left untouched by the introduction of black agents. This is the case, for example, of the conception of the circular orbits in Ptolemy's and Copernicus' systems: it is the same in both cases and can be therefore represented by a white agent.
It is possible to conceive different ways in which new knowledge (intended as new agents) can be inserted in the already available knowledge (intended as an existing scientific agency). These processes of innovation produce black agents and are basically the following ones. Creation regards the description (for the first time) of a new phenomenon by a black agent. For example, the agent representing the addition of epicycles and deferents to the traditional Aristotelian conception is inserted by creation in the agency representing Aristotle's cosmological framework. Alternative is the substitution of an existing agent with a new black one. The black agent represents a model describing in an alternative way (with respect to the old agent) a phenomenon or a set of phenomena. For example, the substitution of the agent representing the conception of the Earth at the center of the universe (Ptolemy's system) with the agent representing the conception of the Sun at the center of the universe (Copernicus' system) is an alternative insertion. Augmentation is the partial substitution of an existing agent with a new black one. The black agent incorporates the old agent by augmenting and enriching it. The phenomenon described is the same, but with more details in the case of the new black agent. For example, the further refinement of Apollonius' and Ipparcus' vision with the addi- tion of equant (besides epicycles and deferents) can be represented by a black agent substituting, by augmentation, the agent representing the previous system composed only by epicycles and deferents. Diminishing is the partial substitution of an existing agent with a new black one, where the new black agent incorporates just a part of the old agent. For example in the Tycho Brahe's system, the white agent representing epicycles, deferents, and equant in the Ptolemy's system is substituted by diminishing with a new black agent which, representing the same structure, is less rich and complete that the old one. The Moon and the Sun both orbit around the Earth (as in the Ptolomy's system), while the other planets orbit around the Sun (to maintain some of the advantages of the Copernican system).
One of the advantages of our approach based on metaphorical scientific agency is to facilitate the analysis of the conceptual and representational change occurring during a scientific discovery process. For example, it is possible to observe relations between models at different levels of abstraction: an agent can be seen also as an agency composed of simpler agents. In this way, it is possible to choose different levels of description of a process, depending on the level of detail required. Moreover, the opportunity to distinguish between the innovation brought by a new model and the innovation brought by the integration of the model within already existing models is based on the modular structure of an agency. It is worth noting, finally, that this approach must work in parallel with traditional philosophical and historical methods of analysis in order to avoid a too schematic analysis of very complex processes. This holds in general with all computational approaches: they need always to be completed by cognitive and social considerations to make models of description as complete as possible.
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented the main results of our investigation about the role of multiagent systems in scientific discovery, an investigation stimulated by Marco Somalvico. We inserted the discussion in the more general framework of the relationships between computational tools and scientific discovery. Two major roles of multiagent systems emerged as significant in this context: the role of support to scientific activities and the role of description of scientific results.
An interesting property, that can be called circularity property, can be envisaged when the two roles (support and representation) are played by the same multiagent system. In this way, the representation of new results, operationally provided by the agents of the system, and the discovery environment, supporting the scientists, can mutually improve each other. This new enhanced computational device supports the production of new results that, in turn, are employed to further empower the tool in a potentially endless evolutionary process.
To better illustrate the circularity property, let us consider again the Human Genome Project scenario. Its results are stored in a collection of databases that record the flood of data emerging from sequencing projects worldwide. GenBank is, for instance, a genetic sequence database that includes an annotated collection of all publicly available DNA sequences. These connected databases can be considered as an embryonic multiagent system for describing scientific results, since formats for exchanging data already exist. The description of the scientific results provided by this simple multiagent system could improve, according to the circularity property, the multiagent system itself. Some agents composing this system, the DNA sequencers for example, could rely on the previous results embedded in the database agents, for example to prevent the repetition of the work already done by others.
Circularity property puts under new light the problem of progress in science. While it is quite easy to characterize different aspects of the theoretical progress, since our models are progressively better detailed when we discover new elements of reality, it is not easy to characterize in a unitary way the technological progress. Circularity permits to think about the technological innovation (the role of support, in our case) as a form of incorporated knowledge. In this sense, what we progressively learn (the role of representation, in our case) is incorporated inside future research tools 57 . Future research activities will be devoted to further validate the approach to scientific discovery presented in this paper. In particular, we are concentrating our attention on the emerging field of bioinformatics in which efficient supports (e.g., to share scientific results) and powerful representations (e.g., to model entities in system biology) are both required. In this way, we aim to follow one of the Marco Somalvico's teachings to pursue both applied and theoretical aspects of research.
